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Abstract. We propose a symmetric key homomorphic encryption
scheme based on the evaluation of multivariate polynomials over a fi-
nite field. The proposed scheme is somewhat homomorphic with respect
to addition and multiplication. Further, we define a generalization of the
Learning with Errors problem called the Hidden Subspace Membership
problem and show that the semantic security of the proposed scheme can
be reduced to the hardness of this problem.
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1 Introduction
An encryption scheme is said to be homomorphic for a set of functions if these
functions can be evaluated on the plaintexts from the corresponding ciphertexts
without decryption. A scheme is called fully homomorphic if functions with
an arbitrary number of additions and multiplications can be homomorphically
evaluated. If the number of additions and multiplications is limited, then the
scheme is said to be somewhat homomorphic. Homomorphic encryption has wide
applications in multiparty computation [9], secure electronic voting [4], private
information retrieval [16] etc.
The first feasible construction of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme
was proposed in [11]. This scheme is based on ideal lattices and uses the con-
cept of bootstrapping to convert a somewhat homomorphic scheme to a fully
homomorphic one. This concept was subsequently used in many other construc-
tions [7,12,20,21]. As an alternative to bootstrapping, a number of schemes were
proposed [5,6,8,13,14] based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [18,19].
A multivariate polynomial based encryption scheme depends on the diffi-
culty of solving a system of non-linear equations over a finite field. Polly Cracker
schemes [10,2] were attempts at constructing homomorphic encryption schemes
using multivariate polynomials. The security of these schemes depends on the
Ideal Membership Problem and relies on the hardness of computing a Gro¨bner
basis for an ideal. These schemes, however, are vulnerable to Linear Algebra-
based attacks and attacks using efficient Gro¨bner basis construction algorithms
[2,22]. Attempts have been made to overcome these vulnerabilities with the ad-
dition of noise as proposed in [1,15].
In this paper, we propose a multivariate polynomial based homomorphic
encryption scheme. The encryption process involves noisily evaluating a multi-
variate polynomial at a set of secret points and adding the scaled plaintext bit to
each of these evaluations. The polynomial is randomly chosen from a secret ideal.
In order to prove the security of the scheme, we have defined a generalization
of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [18,19] called the Hidden Subspace
Membership (HSM) problem and have shown that the semantic security of the
proposed scheme can be reduced to the hardness of this problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the
preliminaries for the proposed work. Section 3 contains the construction of the
proposed scheme. In section 4, we discuss the homomorphic properties of the
scheme and section 5 deals with the analysis of its security.
2 Preliminaries
The following notations are used in the paper. λ denotes the security parameter.
Z and N denote the set of integers and natural numbers respectively. Given a
set S, x $← S means that x is sampled uniformly at random from S. For a
real number x, ⌊x⌋, ⌈x⌉ and ⌊x⌉ denote the rounding of x down, up or to the
nearest integer of x. Zq denotes the set of integers in the interval (− q2 , q2 ]. Fq
denotes a finite field of cardinality q, where q is a prime integer. It represents
the elements in the interval
[− ⌊ q2⌋ , ⌊ q2⌋]. Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ]≤r denotes the set of
polynomials in x1, . . . , xℓ with coefficients in Fq of degree ≤ r. Given a set of
points {z1, . . . , zn} ∈ Fℓq and a polynomial f ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ]≤r, f(z1, . . . , zn) ∈
F
n
q denotes the evaluation of f at these points. We use uppercase bold letters
A,B, . . . to denote matrices and lowercase bold letters a, b, . . . to denote vectors.
The ℓi norm of a vector v is denoted by ‖v‖i and the inner product of two vectors
v1,v2 is denoted using 〈v1,v2〉 := vT1 v2. A function f(x) : N → R is called
negligible if, for every c ∈ N, there exists an integer nc such that |f(x)| < 1xc for
all x > nc.
2.1 Hidden Subspace Membership
The Hidden Subspace membership (HSM) problem involves distinguishing a ran-
dom vector from a noisy vector of a given subspace S. We use the game playing
framework adopted from [3] to formally define the HSM problem.
Definition 1. (Hidden Subspace Membership). Let S be an l dimensional
subspace of the vector space V := Fnq , for some n, q ∈ N and l ≥ 1, such that q is
prime and let N be a noise distribution on Fnq . Then, the HSM problem denoted
as HSMn,q,N can be defined in terms of the game shown in Figure 1.1. A PPT
adversary A wins the game if it can guess the value of β with a non-negligible
advantage, given by
AdvHSM,An,q,N (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[HSMAn,q,N (λ)⇒ 1]−
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
2
Initialize
begin
S ← V(λ, l)
β $← {0, 1}
end
Sample( )
begin
v
$← S, e $← N
v ← v + e
return v
end
Challenge( )
begin
v
$← Fnq
if β = 1 then
v
$← S
e
$← N
v ← v + e
end if
return v
end
Finalize (β′)
begin
return (β=β′)
end
Fig 1.1: HSMn,q,N Game
This problem can be seen as a generalization of the Decisional Learning with
Errors (DLWE) problem which is defined as follows:
Definition 2. (Decisional Learning With Errors). Given a noise distribu-
tion X on Zq and an integer q = q(λ), the DLWE problem can be defined in
terms of the game shown in Figure 1.2. A PPT adversary A wins the game if it
can guess the value of β with a non-negligible advantage given by
AdvLWE,An,q,X (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[LWEAn,q,X (λ)⇒ 1]−
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
Initialize
begin
n← n(λ)
s
$← Znq
β $← {0, 1}
end
Sample( )
begin
a
$← Znq
e $← X
b=
[
a
T
s+e
]
q
return (a, b)
end
Challenge( )
begin
(a, b) $← Zn+1q
if β = 1 then
a
$← Znq
e $← X
b=
[
a
T
s+e
]
q
end if
return (a, b)
end
Finalize (β′)
begin
return (β=β′)
end
Fig 1.2: DLWEn,q,X Game
An LWE sample (ai, bi) ∈ Znq × Zq that satisfies aTi s+ ei = bi (mod q) can
be written as:
[
ai −bi
] [s
1
]
≈X 0 (mod q) (1)
which is a noisy equation with the noise being sampled from the distribution
X on Zq. Hence, the DLWE problem can be seen as an instance of the HSM
problem where the subspace is (s 1)⊥ ⊆ Znq and the noise is added only to the
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last element of the vector. The above discussion is formalized in terms of the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let S be an n-dimensional subspace of the vector space Zn+1q . Let
X be a zero mean distribution on Zq and let N := (0 X ), where 0 ∈ Znq . Then,
any PPT adversary A against the HSM problem HSMn+1,q,N can be transformed
into a PPT adversary B against the LWE problem DLWEn,q,X such that
AdvHSM,An+1,q,N (λ) = Adv
DLWE,B
n,q,X (λ)
Proof. We construct an adversary B against DLWEn,q,X from an adversary A
against HSMn+1,q,N . Observe that, an HSM sample vi ← vi+ei, where vi $← S
and ei
$← N , satisfies the equation vTi s1 ≈X 0, where s1 := (s, 1) ∈ Zn+1q .
When A queries the Sample oracle of HSM, B queries the Sample oracle
of DLWE to obtain (a, b) and returns the vector (a,−b) ∈ Zn+1q to A. Similarly,
whenA queries theChallenge oracle of HSM, B queries theChallenge oracle of
DLWE and answers similarly. IfA outputs the correct value of β for HSMn+1,q,N ,
then B also happens to output the correct value of β for DLWEn,q,X .
Thus solving the LWE problem over Znq is equivalent to solving the HSM
problem over Zn+1q for a subspace of dimension n, where only the last entry is
affected by noise.
Definition 3. (Discrete Gaussian distribution). For α > 0 and for q =
q(λ), the density function of a Gaussian distribution Ψα over R is given by,
Dα(x) =
1√
2piα
exp
(
− 1
2
(
x
α
)2)
. Then, the discrete Gaussian distribution Ψα on
Zq is the distribution with mean zero and standard deviation αq, obtained by
sampling an element x← Dα and outputting ⌊x · q⌉ mod q.
When the noise is sampled according to the distribution Ψα with αq ≥ 2√n,
there exists a quantum reduction from the decisional variant of the shortest
vector problem (GAPSVP) to the LWE problem [18]. A classical reduction has
also been proposed in [17].
We assume that the HSM problem is hard for an l-dimensional subspace
of an n-dimensional space when n − l entries are corrupted by noise sampled
from a discrete Gaussian distribution. (The justification for this assumption and
a detained analysis of the hardness of the HSM problem will be given in the
complete paper.)
3 The Proposed Scheme
Consider an ideal I of the polynomial ring Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ], where q is polynomial
in the security parameter λ. Let I≤r denotes the set of polynomials in I with
degree ≤ r. Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ]≤r is a vector space over Fq of dimension N :=
(
ℓ+r
r
)
and I≤r is a subspace of this vector space. Let dim(I≤r) be the dimension of
this subspace. A polynomial f ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ]≤r evaluated at all points of Fℓq
generates a vector space in Fq
ℓ
q . The set of such vectors obtained by evaluating
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all polynomials in Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ]≤r constitutes an N -dimensional subspace of
F
qℓ
q . Evaluating polynomials in I≤r gives us a dim(I≤r)-dimensional subspace
VI≤r . The ciphertext size n is chosen such that n is polynomial in λ but is
significantly less than q and dim(I≤r) < n ≤ N . We then choose n distinct
points {z1, . . . , zn} ∈ Fℓq which satisfy the following conditions:
1. Every vector in Fnq can be got by evaluating a polynomial in Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ]≤r
at (z1, . . . , zn).
2. Every vector in F
dim(I≤r)
q can be got by evaluating a polynomial in I≤r at
(z1, . . . , zdim(I≤r)).
The conditions imposed on (z1, . . . , zn) ensure that for every given vector s2 ∈
F
n−dim(I≤r)
q , there exists a vector s ∈ (VI≤r )⊥ such that s = (s1, s2).
Let vi ∈ FNq be the vector obtained by evaluating the monomials of degree
≤ r at the point zi ∈ Fℓq, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. LetG ∈ Fn×Nq be the matrix obtained by
assigning G(i, :) = vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let f(x1, . . . , xℓ) be a polynomial, sampled
uniformly at random from I≤r . If f ∈ FNq denotes the coefficient vector of f ,
then f(z1, . . . , zn) = G · f ∈ Fnq .
Let us now consider an example to illustrate the construction of G. For
ℓ = 2, r = 2 and N = 6, the monomials of Fq[x1, x2]≤2 according to the lexico-
graphic order are {1, x1, x2, x21, x1x2, x22}. If n = 3, then let z1 = (z11, z21), z2 =
(z12, z22), z3 = (z13, z23) be 3 distinct points in F
2
q. Then, G ∈ F3×6q represents
the following matrix:
G =

1 z11 z21 z
2
11 z11z21 z
2
21
1 z12 z22 z
2
12 z12z22 z
2
22
1 z13 z23 z
2
13 z13z23 z
2
23

 (2)
The proposed encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms. The
plaintext space is {0, 1} and the ciphertexts are vectors of order n over Fq. Let
X be a noise distribution that samples its entries from the discrete Gaussian
distribution Ψα on Zq.
• KeyGen(1λ): Consider an ideal I ⊆ Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ] and a set of n distinct
points {z1, . . . , zn} in Fℓq and construct the matrix G ∈ Fn×Nq . Choose a
vector s = (s1, s2) ∈ (VI≤r )⊥ and a constant p ∈ N such that, if σs :=
∑n
i=1 si
denotes the sum of the elements of s and e denotes a vector of order n whose
entries are sampled from the distribution X , then η(αq) < σs · p ≤ ⌊q/2⌋ and
the distribution of 〈s, e〉 has a standard deviation < k(αq), where η and k are
constants that depend on the probability of decryption error and the number
of homomorphic operations. The secret key is a basis for the ideal I, the set
of points {z1, . . . , zn} and the integer p. If the choice of I is restricted to a
radical ideal whose variety has a finite number of points, then the ideal can
also be expressed in terms of its variety.
• Encrypt(sk,m): To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}, sample a polynomial f of
degree ≤ r, uniformly at random from the ideal I and a vector e = (0, e),
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where e is a vector of order n − dim(I≤r) and the entries of e are chosen
according to the distribution X . If f denotes the coefficient vector of f and 1
denotes the all 1’s vector of order n and M := m · p, then the ciphertext can
be computed as
c = M · 1+G · f + e (mod q) (3)
• Decrypt(sk, c): Given the ciphertext c, the plaintext m can be recovered as
m =
⌊
1
σs · p
(〈s,c〉mod q)
⌉
mod 2 (4)
Remark 1. This scheme can also be seen as a coding theory based scheme. If the
polynomial chosen in the above encryption scheme is f , then the ciphertext can
be seen as a noisy punctured Reed-Muller encoding of the polynomial f +m.
Correctness of Decryption. Since s ∈ (V≤r)⊥, 〈s,Gf〉 = 0 (mod q). There-
fore,
〈s, c〉 = m · (σsp) + 〈s2, e〉 (mod q) (5)
If |〈s2, e〉| <
⌊
(σs·p)
2
⌋
, then
⌊
1
(σs·p) (〈s,c〉mod q)
⌉
= m (mod 2). If for some ǫ > 0, it
holds that
Pr
e←Xn−dim(I≤r)
[
|〈s2, e〉| >
⌊
(σs·p)
2
⌋]
≤ ǫ (6)
then, the probability of decryption error is at most ǫ. In other words, the de-
cryption function will output the correct message with probability 1 − ǫ. Since
the entries of e are sampled from the distribution X , 〈s2, e〉 is distributed with
a standard deviation ‖s2‖2 αq. If X‖s2‖2αq denotes this distribution, then using
Chebyshev’s inequality, we can write
Pr
x←X‖s2‖2αq
[
|x| >
⌊
(σs·p)
2
⌋]
≤ Pr
x←X‖s2‖2αq
[|x| > kαq] ≤ 1
k2
(7)
where k < σs·p2‖s2‖2αq and ǫ =
1
k2
. Therefore, if p is chosen such that σs · p >
(2 ‖s2‖2 αq)/
√
ǫ, then the probability of decryption error is ≤ ǫ.
For the case when only additive homomorphism is required, we can choose
s = (s1, s2) ∈ (VI≤r )⊥ such that s2 is of the form s2 = (0, . . . , 0, 1). Thus 〈s, e〉
will just be equal to the last entry of e. However as we will see in the subsequent
section that this may not be possible when multiplicative homomorphism is
required.
4 Homomorphic Properties
If φ : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} denotes a function to be performed on the plaintexts
m1, . . . ,mt, then homomorphically evaluating φ involves calculating a new ci-
phertext ceval such that Dec(ceval, sk) = φ(m1, . . . ,mt). Any function φ involv-
ing binary variables can be evaluated using a set of addition and multiplication
gates. The remainder of this section analyses homomorphic addition and multi-
plication of ciphertexts in the proposed scheme.
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4.1 Addition.
Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2 of the respective plaintexts m1 and m2, where
c1 = M1 · 1+G · f1 + e1 and c2 = M2 · 1+G · f2 + e2, homomorphic addition
of m1 and m2 can be performed by computing
cadd = c1 + c2 (mod q)
= (M1 +M2) · 1+G(f1 + f2) + (e1 + e2) (mod q) (8)
Since 〈s,G(f1 + f2)〉 = 0 (mod q) and given that, Mi = mi · p and ei = (0, ei)
for i ∈ {1, 2}, where ei is a vector of order n − dim(I≤r) and its entries are
sampled from the distribution X , we have
〈s, cadd〉 = (m1 +m2) · σs p+ 〈s2, e1 + e2〉 (mod q) (9)
If eadd := 〈s2, e1+e2〉 (mod q), then cadd decrypts correctly to (m1+m2) mod 2
as long as (m1 +m2) · σs p < ⌊q/2⌋ and |eadd| < ⌊(σs · p)/2⌋. The distribution of
eadd is Gaussian with a standard deviation
√
2 ‖s2‖2 αq. It can be easily verified
that due to the increase in the standard deviation after addition, the probability
of decryption error increases by a factor of 2.
4.2 Multiplication.
Multiplication is based on the fact that, given two polynomials f1, f2 ∈
Fq[x1, . . . , xℓ]≤r and an evaluation point z ∈ Fℓq,
f1(z) · f2(z) = (f1 · f2) (z) (10)
where deg(f1f2) ≤ 2r. Therefore, f1f2 ∈ I but it is not an element of the
subspace I≤r . In order to do homomorphic multiplication, n must be greater
than the dimension of VI≤2r and the vector s = (s1, s2) must be an element
of (VI≤2r )
⊥ such that s2 ∈ Fn−dim(I≤2r)q . The noise must be added to the last
n− dim(I≤r) entries.
Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2, the homomorphic multiplication of its re-
spective plaintexts m1 and m2 can be obtained by taking the component-wise
product of c1 and c2. In order to maintain the invariant structure 〈s, c〉 =
m · (σs p) + 〈s2, e〉 for decryption, we multiply the product by 1/p. Specifically,
if c1 = M1 · 1+G · f1 + e1 and c2 = M2 · 1+G · f2 + e2, then
cmult =
1
p
(c1 ⊙ c2) (mod q)
= (m1m2)p · 1+m1 ·Gf2 +m1 · e2 +m2 ·Gf1 +m2 · e1
+
1
p
[Gf1 ⊙ e2 + e1 ⊙Gf2 + (Gf1 ⊙Gf2) + (e1 ⊙ e2)] (mod q) (11)
where ⊙ denotes the component-wise product of two vectors. Given that, Mi =
mi · p and ei = (0, ei) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where ei is a vector of order n− dim(I≤r)
and its entries are sampled from the distribution X ,
〈s, cmult〉 = (m1m2) · σs p+
〈
s2,m1 · e2 +m2 · e1 + 1
p
· (e1 ⊙ e2)
〉
(mod q) (12)
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If emult :=
〈
s2,m1 · e2 +m2 · e1 +
1
p
· (e1 ⊙ e2)
〉
(mod q), then cmult decrypts cor-
rectly to m1m2 as long as |emult| < ⌊(σs · p)/2⌋, where emult is a random variable
with mean zero and standard deviation <
√
2αq + 1√
p
(αq)2.
While homomorphic addition does not impose any constraints on the ci-
phertext size, it does lead to an increase in noise. This limits the number of
additions possible. Homomorphic multiplication introduces more noise than ad-
dition and the size of the ciphertext increases significantly with the number of
multiplications possible. The increase in noise by homomorphic operations can
be countered by using techniques such as modulus switching [8,6]. (The complete
paper will contain a more detailed discussion about the same.) Countering the
increase in ciphertext size for homomorphic multiplication remains a challenge.
5 Security
We show that the proposed scheme is semantically secure based on the hardness
of the Hidden Subspace Membership problem. In a Chosen Plaintext Attack
(CPA) model, the adversary has a number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs at its
disposal. A symmetric key encryption scheme is said to be semantically secure or
indistinguishable under a chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) if, given sufficient
samples (plaintext-ciphertext pairs), no adversary can distinguish between the
encryptions of 0 from the encryptions of messages of its choice with probability
more than 12 .
Definition 4. (IND-CPA Security). The IND-CPA security of a symmetric
encryption scheme can be defined in terms of the game shown in Figure 1.3. A
PPT adversary A selects two messages (m0,m1) such that one of them is 0 and
the Left-Right oracle outputs the encryption of one of the messages by choosing
β $← {0, 1}. A wins the game if it can guess the value of β with a non-negligible
advantage defined by
AdvIND-CPA,A(λ) :=
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[A IND-CPAEncsk(·) (λ) = 1]− Pr[A IND-CPAEncsk(0) (λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣
Initialize
begin
sk←KeyGen()
β $← {0, 1}
end
Encrypt(0, sk)
begin
c←Enc(m,sk)
return c
end
Left-Right(m0,m1)
begin
c←Enc(mβ ,sk)
return c
end
Finalize (β′)
begin
return (β=β′)
end
Fig 1.3: IND-CPA Game
It is clear from the construction of the scheme that the encryptions of 0
are noisy elements of the subspace VI≤r ⊆ Fnq . Therefore, distinguishing an
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encryption of 0 from the encryption of a random message is equivalent to solving
the HSM problem as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. A PPT adversary A that breaks the IND-CPA security of the pro-
posed scheme with non-negligible advantage ǫ can be converted into a PPT ad-
versary B that can solve an instance of the HSM problem with advantage at least
ǫ
2 .
Proof. B initializes A with the parameters (q, n,X ). When A asks for an encryp-
tion of 0, B queries the procedure Sample of the HSM game to get v ← v + e,
where e $← Xn and returns the vector c = v. Similarly, when A queries the
Left-Right oracle of the IND-CPA game, B queries the procedure Challenge
of the HSM game to get v and returns a vector c upon choosing β $← {0, 1} and
setting c = v + (p ·mβ) · 1.
If the sample obtained from the Challenge oracle of HSM is a noisy element
of S, then A runs in a similar environment to that of the IND-CPA game and
hence, B outputs β with probability 12 + ǫ. On the other hand, if the sample
returned is uniform in Fnq , then B outputs β with probability 12 . Therefore, the
probability that B solves the HSM problem is ≥ 12 + ǫ2 . Hence, the advantage ofB in solving the HSM problem is ≥ ǫ2 .
6 Conclusions
A symmetric key homomorphic encryption scheme has been proposed based on
the evaluation of multivariate polynomials. The security of the scheme is based
on the hardness of the Hidden Subspace Membership problem. In its current
form, the scheme is somewhat homomorphic and for a given ciphertext size, can
perform a limited number of homomoprhic additions and multiplications. Future
work includes converting the scheme into a fully homomorphic one and designing
a public key variant of the same.
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